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[Crlm. No. 11161. In Bank. Oct. 3, 1967.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PHILLIP K. 
FEGGANS, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Appeal-Appointment and Duties of Counsel. 
-Under Anders v. Oalifornia, 386 U.S. 738 [18 L.Ed.2d 493, 
87 S.Ct. 1396], regardless of how frivolous an appeal may 
appear and of how convinced appointed counsel for a criminal 
defendant may be that there is nothing to advocate, counsel 
must prepare a brief setting forth a statement of facts with 
citations to the transcript, discussing the legal issues with 
citations of appropriate authority, and arguing all arguable 
issues, advocating changes in the law if argument can be made 
in support thereof; if counsel concludes that there are no 
arguable issues and the appeal is frivolous, he may limit his 
brief to a statement of facts and applicable law and ask to 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 146 et seq; Am.Jur.2d. 
Criminal Law, § 321. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 1048.5; [2, 3] 
Criminal Law, § 374(2). 
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withdraw, but must not argue the case against his client; 
counsel is not allowed to withdraw until the court is satisfied 
that he has discharged his duty to the court and his client; if 
counsel is allowed to withdraw, defendant must be given an 
opportunity to present a brief, and the court must then decide 
whether the appeal is frivolous; if any contention raised is 
reasonably arguable, no matter how the court feels it will 
probably be resolved, the court must appoint another counsel 
to argue the appeal. 
[2] Id. - Evidence - Identification - Police Lineup. - The rule 
requiring exclusion of identification evidence obtained at a 
police showup at which the accused did not have the assist-
ance of counsel is restricted to showups occurring after June 
12, 1967, as a matter of state law. 
[3] Id.-Evidence-Identiiication-Police Lineup.-Defendant ill a 
criminal prosecution was not denied due process by the part a 
police showup played in his conviction where two of the wit-
nesses were shown four or five pictures including defendant 
before the showup and identified him from the pictures as well 
as at the showup, but there was no evidence that the pictures 
were used to prime the witnesses to identify defendant, and 
the showup appeared to have been conducted with scrupulous 
regard for fairness. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ala-
meda County. Lewis E. Lercara, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for robbery. Judgment of conviction of first 
degree robbery affirmed. 
Phillip K. Feggans, in pro. per., and Robert N. Beechinor, 
under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and 
Appellant. . 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Michael J. Phelan, 
Joyce F. Nedde and Robert R. Granucci, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-A jury found defendant guilty on two 
counts of first degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), and the 
trial court imposed consecutive sentences for the term pro-
vided by law. Defendant appealed, and upon his request the 
Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District appointed 
counsel to represent him. Counsel informed defendant and the 
court by letter that after thorough study of the record, 
discl,lSsion with defendant and his trial counsel, and research 
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on the legal points raised, he concluded there was no merit in 
the appeal. He requested and was given permission to with-
draw from the case. (See In re Nash, 61 Ca1.2d 491, 495 [39 
Cal.Rptr. 205, 393 P.2d 405].) The court gave defendant 30 
days in which to file a brief. He filed an opening and a closing 
brief and the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in an 
opinion certified for nonpublication under rule 976, California 
Rules of Court. (People v. Feggans, 1 Crim. 5220.) Defendant 
filed a petition for hearing in propria persona, which we- -
granted because it appeared that defendant had been denied 
the assistance of counsel on appeal required by Anders v. 
CaUfornia, 386 U.S. 738 [18 L.Ed.2d 493, 87 8.Ct. 1396]. We 
appointed new counsel to represent defendant in this court. 
On December 23, 1964, Emmet Candland, the clerk in 
charge of a liquor store in Berkeley was robbed. He testified 
that the. robber entered the store at 7 :30 a.m. and bought a 
package of gum. He left the store and returned at 8 a.m. At 
that time there was a customer in the store. The robber took a 
gun from a shoulder holster and told Candland to give him all 
thc money in the store. Candland gave the robber $91 from 
the cash register and $208 from a back room. Another 
customer entered the store; the robber warned Candland and 
his customers not to telephone the police and then left. Cand-
land started to telephone the police, but while the telephone 
was ringing the robber came back into the store, told Cand-
land to get away from the telephone and warned the three 
men again. Candland decided to ·wait a short time before 
telephoning the police, and while he was waiting the robber 
entered the store again. This time the robber hit one of the 
customers on the head and took his wallet. The robber left 
again and did not return. The two customers testified to the 
same course of events. They had ample time to see the robber. 
On December 30, 1964, Thomas Eaton, the attendant in 
charge of a Chevron service station in Oakland, was robbed. 
He testified that at 8 :20 p.m. the robber drove up in a Buick 
Ilardtop sedan, pointed a gun at him, gave him a paper bag 
and told him to put the station's money in the bag. The 
robber took $107. Eaton called the police immediately after 
the robber left and gave them a description of the car and the 
license plate number. 
Defendant was arrestcd at 8 :45 that same night when he 
was found at a house in San Francisco during a police raid. 
The officers had information that narcotics were sold and 
stolen property received on the premises. When the officers 
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found defendant in a bedroom, he dropped a gun, holster and 
belt to his feet. A search incident to his arrest produced a key 
that fitted a Buick sedan with the same license plate number 
as the vehicle used in the service station robbery. 
Candland and the two customers at the liquor store identi-
fied defendant as the robber at a police showup and at the 
trial. Eaton also identified defendant at the same police 
showup and at the trial. 
Defendant was ably represented at the trial. He contends, 
however, that he was denied effective assistance of counsel on 
appeal when his appointed counsel informed the court that 
there was no merit in his appeal and withdrew from the case. 
In Anders v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 738, the United 
States Supreme Court held unconstitutional the no-merit 
letter procedure we had set forth in In re Nas"', supra, 61 
Ca1.2d 491, 495, for regulating the appointment of counsel for 
indigent appellants. Relying on Eskridge v. Washington 
Prisoo Board, 357 U.S. 214 [2 L.Ed.2d 1269, 78 8. Ct. 1061], 
and Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 [9 L.Ed.2d 892, 83 8.Ct. 
768], the court concluded that the no-merit letter procedure 
unconstitutionally conditioned an, indigent's right of appeal 
(see Douglas v. California, 372 U.S 353 [9 L.Ed.2d 811, 83 
S.Ct. 814] ; Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 [9 L.Ed.2d 
899, 83 S.Ct. 774]) and did not afford him the representation 
the Constitution demands. [1] Under Anders, regardless of 
how frivolous an appeal may appear and regardless of how 
convinced appointed counsel as an advocate may be that there 
is nothing to advocate, a no-merit letter will not suffice. 
Counsel must prepare a brief to assist the court in under-
standing the facts and the legal issues in the case. The brief 
must set forth a statement of the facts with citations to the 
transcript, discuss the legal issues with citations of appropri-
ate authority, and argue all issues that are arguable. More-
over, counsel serves both the court and his client by advocat-
ing changes in the law if argument can be made supporting 
change. If counsel concludes that there are no arguable issues 
and the appeal is frivolous, he may limit his brief to a state-
ment of the facts and applicable law and may ask to withdraw 
from the case, but he must not argue the case against his 
client. Counsel is not allowed to withdraw from the case until 
the court is satisfied that he has discharged his duty to the 
court and his client to set forth adequately the facts and 
issues involved. If counsel is allowed to withdraw, defendant 
must be given an opportunity to present a brief, and there-
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after the court must decide for itself whether the appeal is 
frivolous. (Anders v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 738, 741-742 
[18 L.Ed.2d 493, 497-498, 87 8. Ct. 1396]; Ellis v. Uftited 
States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 [2 L.Ed.2d 1060, 1061, 78 8.Ct. 
974].) If any contention raised is reasonably arguable, no 
matter how the court feels it will probably be resolved, the 
court must appoint another counsel to argue the appeal. 
Counsel appointed by the Court of Appeal in this case 
raised seven points in his letter to the court, some that were 
based on discussions with defendant, and others on a study of 
the record. In answering each point he sought to show the 
court that it had no merit. He did not set forth the relevant 
facts, he cited no applicable authorities, he argued the case 
against defendant, and he determined to withdraw from the 
. case on the basis of the merits of the points raised, not on~ ~ 
whether they were frivolous. Such representation did not 
constitute the assistance of counsel required by Anders. The 
case has now been briefed and argued, however, .by new 
counsel appointed by this court. 
Defendant testified that he did not commit either robbery. 
He was positively identified at the police showup and at the 
trial by all the witnesses to the crimes. At the showup, 
however, he did not have the assistance of counsel, a right 
that it has since been determined is guaranteed by the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion. (United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 [18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 
87 8. Ct. 1926]; Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 [18 
L.Ed.2d 1178, 87 8.Ct. 1951].) [2] The question presented, 
therefore, is whether we should apply the rule of the Wade 
and Gilbert cases to all cases still pending or restrict that 
rule to showups occurring after Wade and Gilbert were 
decided on June 12, 1967. Showups conducted before that date 
in which defendants did not have the assistance of counsel 
"threaten to be of significant quantity" (People v. Rivers, 
66 Ca1.2d 1000, 1004 [59 Cal.Rptr. 851, 429 P:2d 171]), 
and we conclude that the same reasons that led the Supreme 
Court in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296 [18 L.Ed. 
2d 1199, 1203, 87 8.Ct. 1967] to permit prospective opera-
tion of Wade and Gilbert as a matter of constitutional 
law dictate that they also should operate prospectively as a 
matter of state law. (See People v. Rivers, supra, 66 Ca1.2d 
1000; People v. Charles, 66 Ca1.2d 330 [57 Cal.Rptr. 745, 
425 P.2d 545] ; People v. Rollins, 65 Ca1.2d 681, [56 Cal.Rptr. 
293, 423 P.2d 221].) [3] As in the Stovall case, however, 
.) 
Oct. 1967] PEOPLE V. FEGGANS 
[67 C.2d 444; 62 Cal.Rptr. 419. 432 P.2d 21] 
449 
we have scrutinized the record with respect to the showup to 
determine whether defendant was denied due process by the 
part the showup played in his conviction. Two of the 
witnesses were shown four or five pictures including defend-
ant's before the showup and identified him from the pictures 
as well as at the showup. There is no evidence that the pic-
tures were used to prime the witnesses to identify defendant, 
and the showup itself appears to have been conducted with 
scrupulous regard for fairness. The procedure did not deny 
defendant due process. 
We have considered and reviewed the contentions raised by 
defendant in his briefs in propria persona and those raised by 
counsel and find nothing to require further discussion. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
McComb, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., and SullIvan, 
J., concurred. 
PETERS, J.-I dissent. 
I cannot agree that, under state law, it should be held that 
the right to counsel at a lineup, announced in United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 [18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 87 8.Ct. 1926], and 
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 [18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 87 8.Ct. 
1951], should not apply to cases pending when these decisions 
were announced. The rule of Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 
[18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 87 S.Ct. 1967], holding such decisions are 
purely prospective is not binding on state courts, and should 
not, in my opinion, be followed here. 
I have already expressed my disagreement with the 
majority of this court over their determinations on the issue 
of retroactivity of criminal cases. (See my dissents in People 
v. Rollins, 65 Ca1.2d 681, 693 [56 Cal.Rptr. 293, 423 P.2d 221] 
and People v. Rivers, 66 Cal.2d 1000, 1005 [59 Cal.Rptr. 851, 
429 P.2d 171].) 
This is another in a whole series of cases dealing with the 
troublesome problem of the effective date of criminal decisions 
relating to constitutional rights. For many years the hi~h 
court had held that its decisions in this field were whol1v 
retroactive. (Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 [9 L.Ed.2d 
799, 83 8.Ct. 792, 93 A.L.R.2d 733]; Hamilton v. Alabama, 
368 U.S. 52 [7 L.Ed.2d 114, 82 8.Ot. 157] ; Douglas v. Cali-
fornia, 372 U.S. 353 [9 L.Ed.2d 811, 83 8.Ct. 814].) Then this 
court (In re Lopez, 62 Ca1.2d 368 [42 Cal.Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 
" C.Id-1i 
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380]) and the United States Supreme Court (Linkletter v. 
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 [14 L.Ed.2d 601, 85 S.Ct. 1731] ; Tehan 
v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 [15 L.Ed.2d 453, 86 S.Ct. 459]) discov-
ered the device of making its decisions in criminal cases 
partially prospective, by holding that they applied only to 
pending appeals. Then the United States Supreme Court 
approached pure prospective operation when it held in J ohn-
son v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 [16 L.Ed.2d 882, 86 S.Ct. 
1772], that the rules announced the week before in Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 
A.L.R.3d 974], should apply only to cases tried after the date 
Miranda was decided, although the constitutional evasion took 
place before Miranda was decided. In the Johnson case the 
high court also announced that its rulings in Escobedo v. 
Illinois, 378 U.s. 478 [12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758], were 
prospective in that they applied only to cases tried after 
Escobedo was decided. Then in Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 
U.S. 293, the court reached pure prospective operation by 
holding that the lineup rules announced in United States v. 
Wade, supra, 388 U.S. 218, and Gilbert v. California, supra, 
388 U.S. 263, should apply only to cases where the lineup was 
held after June 12, 1967, the date on which these caSes were 
decided'. ' 
So far as federal law is concerned those cases are, of course, 
binding upon us. But in adopting its various rules of par-
tially or wholly prospective operation the high court was 
careful to announce that the states were free to adopt more 
stringent rules of retroactivity if they so desired. (Johnson v. 
New Jersey, supra, 384 U.S. 719.) The California Supreme 
Court quickly accepted this invitation when it held in People 
v. Rollins, supra, 65 Cal.2d 681, that we would not follow the 
high court as to the effective date of Escobedo v. Illinois, 
supra, 378 U.S. 478, holding, contrary to the United States 
Supreme Court, that it applied to pending appeals as a matter 
of state law, but would follow it as to the effective date of 
Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436. 
The attitude of this court, as a matter of state law, toward 
retroactivity was clearly demonstrated when it was faced with 
the question whether the rules announced in People v. 
Aranda, 63 Cal.2d 518 [47 Cal.Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265], 
applied to cases tried before Aranda but pending on appeal 
when that case was decided. In People v. Charles, 86 Cal.2d 
330 [57 Cal.Rptr. 745, 425 P.2d 545], we held that the newly 
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discovered rules, not involving federal constitutional rights, 
applied to all cases not yet final when Aranda was decided. 
Thus, we have been reluctant in the past to follow the 
Supreme Court of -the United States on the issue of retro-
activity. We should be reluctant to follow it on the lineup 
problem. We should not blindly follow it on that issue. In my 
opinion, to be consistent, the very least we should hold is that 
Wade and Gilbert apply to pending appeals. These cases deal 
with the fundamental and constitutional right of counsel. If 
Escobedo (which involves the right to counsel at interroga-
tion), under state law, is to apply to pending cases, then the 
right of counsel involved in the lineup cases should also apply 
to- pending appeals. If, under state law, the rules announced 
in Aranda, are to apply to pending cases, then the more 
important right here involved should also apply to pending 
cases. 
There is no consistency in what this court is doing on this 
isSue. Certainly no general principle has been announced that 
will settle whether criminal law decisions are to be retroactive 
or prospective. What the court is doing is to leave that deter-
mination to be made case by case. That, in my opinion, is not 
an intelligent way for the law t<~ develop. 
I would hold that the lineup' rule, under state law, is retro-
active at least to the extent that it applies to pending cases. 
